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ABSTRACT
Researchers at the United States National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) are jointly investigating
issues associated with an environment in which a single
pilot, or reduced crew, might operate transport category
aircraft.  In this paper we initially, and very briefly,
summarize selected findings of a technical interchange
meeting (TIM) coordinated and hosted by NASA.  This
meeting of a cross section of the aviation community
addressed issues involved with a move from two pilot to
single pilot operations for transport category aircraft.
Following this, and based in part on these findings, we
espouse a position that such an endeavor will require
development of air-ground teaming, where a ground-based
operator will have to be able to support many of the
traditional roles of the copilot.
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BACKGROUND: WHY CONSIDER SINGLE PILOT
OPERATIONS?
Starting in the 1950s, commercial aviation began
experiencing what Harris called, -
Historically, a five-person flight crew has been gradually
-person crew. This de-crewing has
been gradual rather than the result of some radical, one-time
change in required crew size. With technological
developments, one-by-one, the need for humans to perform
three roles, flight engineer, navigator, and radio operator,
disappeared. Because technological advancements
continue, it is not a surprise that some in the aviation
community are currently considering further crew
reduction.  Specifically, some are questioning whether a
two-person crew continues to be necessary in commercial
aviation.
Harris reported that the historic crew reduction events in
commercial aviation have not posed threats to flight safety
[1], and now some in the aviation community believe that
the concept of single pilot operations (SPO) (or a similar
de-crewing strategy) warrants serious consideration and
exploration. In fact, researchers began addressing SPO as
early as 2005 [2], and others have since addressed SPO [1,
3]. In 2010, a Brazilian aircraft manufacturer (Embraer)
announced that it planned to provide single-pilot
capabilities by approximately 2020 [4]. Such
announcements from industry further suggest that some are
taking the idea of reduced crew operations quite seriously.
Of course, the current conference provides additional, clear
evidence that the aviation community has interest in
exploring the potential for another phase in the de-crewing
trend.
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INVESTIGATING SPO
Researchers at the United States National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) Ames Research Center
(ARC) and Langley Research Center (LaRC) are jointly
investigating issues associated with various potential
concepts, or configurations, in which a single pilot, or
reduced crew, might operate. As part of their early efforts,
these NASA researchers hosted an SPO TIM in order to
gain insight from members of the aviation community. The
meeting was held on April 10-12, 2012 at NASA Ames
Research Center. Professionals in the aviation domain were
invited because their areas of expertise were deemed to be
directly related to an exploration of SPO. NASA, in
selecting prospective participants, attempted to represent
various relevant sectors within the aviation domain.
Approximately 70 people representing government,
academia, and industry attended.
A primary focus of this gathering was to consider how tasks
and responsibilities might be re-allocated to allow for SPO.
In this paper we highlight some of the considerations
discussed at the meeting. In particular, we take the position
that ground personnel can have a significant role in
enabling SPO.
Preliminary Findings from the SPO TIM
General Reaction of Meeting Participants. Overall, but not
without exception, the meeting participants seemed to
believe that the industry was moving toward SPO. Several
possible configurations were mentioned. The most
ground served as a second pilot for several flights
simultaneously. However, some participants and
workgroups also suggested that simply doing without the
second person assisting the pilot (pure single pilot) or a
configuration with a non-pilot (e.g., dispatcher or a member
of the cabin crew) supporting the flight operation was either
more desirable or more likely to be adopted. Participants
also mentioned unmanned aerial systems (UASs)
periodically in the context of comparing single pilot
operations to the situation in which no pilot was present. On
several occasions, they pondered whether or not UASs
might represent some future state in which we may find
airspace operations.
General Issues Relevant to Any SPO Configuration. Issues
raised were plentiful and diverse. One way to conceptualize
the results of the meeting is to present five areas the
participants felt should be addressed in relation to SPO: (1)
automation issues, (2) operational issues, (3) pilot
incapacitation, (4) communication/social issues, and (5)
certification and approval issues.
Participants frequently voiced concerns regarding
automation issues in SPO. First, they strongly suggested
that legal responsibilities must be seriously considered in
designing automated systems for SPO.  Pilots are
accountable for a range of tasks that may be assigned to
automation on an SPO flight deck. This raises questions
regarding how much legal responsibility can be reasonably
placed on the single pilot if something goes wrong. If an
automated system fails and this leads to an incident or
accident, how would fault be assigned (pilot, aircraft
manufacturer, or software engineers)? Second, participants
expressed concern regarding the use of adaptive
automation. They suggested that unless great care is taken
to ensure that the pilot is informed as to what the
automation is or is not doing, the pilot may lose overall
situation awareness of different automation states.
However, such feedback and need for monitoring the
automation might yield unnecessary workload. Participants
suggested that, to be safe, several taxonomies should be
considered when developing automation (e.g., various
levels of automation, the sharing and blending of
automation, adaptive and adaptable automation, etc.).
Third, participants voiced concerns that a probable increase
in automation use under SPO will lead to skill degradation.
 should
we determine whether or not more automation is needed.
Trajectory based operations and pilot workload. The
evolution of air traffic management towards the Next
Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) in the
United States, and the Single European Sky Air Traffic
Management Research vision in Europe, raises a number of
operational issues for SPO. It is generally thought that
under future air traffic management concepts, significant
responsibilities will be given to the flight deck. One
example is trajectory based operations (TBO) where
aircraft will be expected to fly precise 4D trajectories and to
keep their routes synchronized with computers on the
ground. Today, when making a weather deviation, the flight
crew must only request a new heading and can determine
when to return to their previous path at a later time. Under
TBO the flight crew must develop an entirely new flight
plan, potentially increasing workload. Will future single
pilots be able to manage their single pilot task with the
addition of these new TBO requirements?
The issue of pilot incapacitation surfaced quite frequently in
discussions of SPO. A few participants suggested that SPO
would not be feasible due to the possibility that the single
pilot could become incapacitated, while others felt the issue
was being overemphasized. The majority of attendees
seemed to believe the issue was an extremely important one
but that it could be effectively addressed. For example, the
use of proactive approaches, such as requiring more
sophisticated or frequent medical examinations for the
single pilot, or actively monitoring pilot health during flight
were mentioned on several occasions. Real-time monitoring
of pilots could incorporate measures that assume
incapacitation is often a progressive state, and early
symptoms might assist in identifying less than optimal
conditions. Such monitoring also could be in the form of
assessing the physical state and/or mental state of the pilot,
with the latter being relatively more difficult to achieve.
Several participants felt that state-of-the-art equipment is
not currently able to handle such monitoring, and, even if it
was, some suggested that the decision as to whether or not a
pilot is incapacitated should be reserved for another human.
Pilot incapacitation was considered to be the issue that
might be most detrimental with regard to the acceptance of
SPO. Several participants suggested that the pilot
community, the general public, insurance companies, and
unions be polled to learn of their willingness to accept SPO,
given the possibility of pilot incapacitation in a single pilot
environment.
Communication and social issues were identified by
attendees. They pondered whether the lack of social
have detrimental effects. Furthermore, under normal
circumstances, the lack of informal social interactions may
result in boredom, especially given that increases in
automation use are likely. Such boredom is known to lead
to a lack of situation awareness and an over reliance on
automation.
Certification and approval of SPO for part 121 operations.
Participants discussed how SPO operations would be
approved for part 121 (Air Carrier) operations. A focus of
the discussion was evaluating the impact of new task
allocations strategies on many different aspects of part 121
operations. These topics included, the regulation of new
training paradigms as pilot responsibilities change, changes
to procedures in a distributed system, and the adequacy of
methods for evaluating increasingly complex hardware and
software systems. Concern was expressed that it will be
difficult to show equivalent levels of safety for reduced
crew in the presence of failures, and that if task allocation
strategies employed rely on the automation having authority
over control of the airplane that the evaluation may require
processes and standards equivalent to a UAS.
Air-Ground Teaming for SPO
One factor in previous crew reductions was the increased
availability of ground personnel. Directed communications
such as the Aircraft Communications Addressing and
Reporting System (ACARS) meant that pilots could offload
high workload strategic tasks such as planning for
diversions and strategic weather re-routes to an Airline
Operations Center (AOC) without clogging the radio party
line communications. This was considered critical in the
move from the three pilot flight deck to the two pilot flight
deck. One presenter reported that the Federal Aviation
Administration would not certify Piedmont Airlines for
two-man operations in 1978 unless the airline demonstrated
121.99, that is, ACARS. The increased communication
bandwidth available with current technologies will enable
ground personnel to play an even greater role in reducing
pilot workload, especially peak workload.
Based on the presentations and discussions of attendees,
and above summary, we take the position that there will be
a need for air-ground teams in which single pilots are
supported by ground-based operators who will assume
some, if not all, of the roles and responsibilities of the
second on-board pilot. We can imagine a variety of specific
implementations of this approach from a single operator
acting as a remote co-pilot for a single plane to a remote
follower working a group of planes to a ground based team
of experts who are called in on an ad hoc basis. Of course,
we also expect onboard automation to play a critical role in
any move to SPO; however, a human ground-based
operator is able to bring unique capabilities. First, ground-
based team members can help handle workload problems
associated with unexpected and challenging situations for
which the automation may not be designed, and where
human problem solving is a critical activity. For example,
systems failures, especially failures of the automation itself,
may require human problem solving abilities. Second, and
similarly, since future flight decks may not be fully
augmented with the latest automation, and some ground
elements (i.e., AOCs) may naturally possess more advanced
automation there will  be situations in which people on the
ground may have more or different information and
automated capabilities, than the flight deck. Access to
additional information and automation might be useful, for
example, in weather re-routing, where even today AOCs are
given significant input into routing decisions. As noted
above, re-routing is likely to become more complicated
under NextGen TBO concepts and it seems only natural
that the AOC or some other ground based system absorb
that extra workload. Third, a ground-based team member
may be better suited to evaluation of pilot incapacitation.
While it may be possible to design reliable automation that
will detect a number of physiological indicants of degraded
capability or physical distress, people are certainly more
sensitive than any present or envisioned automation to the
behavioral subtleties that may signal a cognitive
degradation (e.g., confusion, agitation, or emotional
distress). Fourth, a ground-based team member would
provide a partner that could hopefully mitigate issues of
boredom through periodic interactions, and also provide
any missing social pressure needed to support the diligent
performance of duties.
However, along with the benefits of this approach, there are
unique challenges. First, the issue of proper allocation of
functions to the remotely located human was raised on
numerous occasions. Since the particular tasks assigned to
the ground-based team member will probably determine
whether or not this arrangement is effective, the task
choices are of utmost importance. For example, some
information is probably best received and/or utilized when
onboard the aircraft (e.g., turbulence). Second, in order for
SPO to yield cost savings, this configuration may not be
plausible unless the remote pilot can serve to assist multiple
single pilots. Thus whether a team member on the ground
can support multiple flights, and how high workload
situations will be handled, must be addressed. Third,
support for crew resource management (CRM) across
distributed team members was also identified as a critical
issue that must be examined. The efficacy of CRM in
making flight safer was highlighted at the TIM, and the
criticality of developing air-ground teaming that retains this
was emphasized. Finally, this configuration warrants asking
whether the loss of the immediate interpersonal information
and feedback between co-located pilots (e.g., body
language, facial expressions, pointing/nodding at displays,
etc) may be significantly detrimental to team performance,
and how to compensate for it if it is. The TIM participants
found this to be one of the critical issues to be addressed if
a ground-based team member was going to function as
described above. This last issue will be addressed in
upcoming research.
PLANNED RESEARCH BASED ON FINDINGS FROM
THE SPO TIM
A series of studies is being mapped out in which the goal is
to assess the effectiveness of a distributed approach to SPO.
The objective of the initial study is to explore the degree to
which the location of pilots (proximate or remote) has an
impact on their ability to work as a two-person crew. In this
study, pairs of pilots will be asked to complete simulated
flights in each of three conditions: co-located, remote and
alone.
In the co-located condition, pilots will work together in a
two person flight simulator that corresponds to current-day
conditions. The remote condition will be almost identical to
the co-located condition except that the right and left seats
of the cockpit will be placed in different rooms. They will
be allowed to communicate as freely as they would like,
however they will not have the ability to see each other,
observe each others body language or be able to point to
information like weather cells on the navigation display.
The inclusion of this condition allows the authors to assess
if location (proximate or remote) results in performance
differences. Finally, in the alone condition, one pilot will be
asked to perform these tasks. This condition allows the
researchers to determine if the scenarios used truly require
the work of two people or if inclusion of a second person
does, in fact, help some. In short, this phase serves as a
baseline condition.
The pilots will be purposely presented with a critical
situation that requires problem solving. The situation will
be one in which the two-person crew encounters weather
during their flight, and the weather is such that it creates the
need to divert to an alternate airport. Scenarios will vary on
a number of factors that add complexity to the diversion
task, such as the amount of fuel onboard to support planned
or unplanned diversions and system failures such as ant-
skid that require the crew to recalculate landing weights and
distances.
In future experiments, we intend to create first generation
ground dispatch station that fully support flight deck, AOC,
and air traffic control collaboration in a NextGen TBO
environment. This workstation may better represent what
might ultimately be used on the ground by a remotely based
second pilot to support all aspects of current and future
flight operations. The station will allow the flight deck to
share all task, roles and responsibilities in a similar fashion
-person flight deck. After developing
such a station, a series of studies similar to the first will be
conducted to assess the viability of the distributed concept.
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